Government Workers and Government Speech by Norton, Helen
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
2008 
Government Workers and Government Speech 
Helen Norton 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment 
Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States 
Commons 
Citation Information 
Helen Norton, Government Workers and Government Speech, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 75 (2008), available at 
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/743. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
Citation: 7 First Amend. L. Rev. 75 2008-2009 
Provided by: 
William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Mar 21 13:37:07 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 




Under what circumstances may the government consider the
speech of its employees as its own, thus permitting it to control that
speech without running afoul of the First Amendment? Concluding that
a government employer should remain free to "exercise . . .employer
control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created,"' the
Supreme Court held in Garcetti v. Ceballos that public employees'
speech made "pursuant to their official duties" receives no FirstS2
Amendment protection. In so holding, the Court created a bright-line
rule that essentially defines government workers' speech pursuant to
their official duties as the government's own speech-i.e., speech that
the government has bought and thus may control, regardless of the
strength of the public's interest in it or its impact, if any, on
governmental efficiency.
Another illustration of courts' increasing willingness to permit
government to control its workers' speech to protect its own expressive
interests,3  Garcetti significantly expanded government's already
Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. Many thanks
for an outstanding conference to the organizers of, and my fellow participants in, the
First Amendment Law Review's February 2008 symposium, "Public Citizens,
Public Servants: Free Speech in the Post-Garcetti Workplace." Thanks also to
Jennifer McGinn for excellent research assistance.
1. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006).
2. Id. at 421.
3. As another example of this trend, consider courts' growing tendency to
permit government agencies to control their workers' objectionable off-duty speech
for fear that the public will inevitably associate that off-duty expression with
government in a way that might undermine the government's ability to communicate
its own contrary views. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004)
(rejecting a police officer's First Amendment challenge to his termination for
appearing in sexually explicit videotapes); Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918,
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substantial power4 over public employee speech. It did so, however,
without examining when and why government expression appropriately
merits governmental control free from First Amendment scrutiny, thus
imperiling not only employees' free speech rights but also the public's
interest in transparent government.
GOVERNMENT SPEECH GENERALLY
Government must speak if it is to govern. As Professors
Bezanson and Buss explain:
Democratic governments must speak, for democracy is a
two-way affair. This is particularly true in representative
democracies, where governments' speech must consist
not just of information but also of explanation,
persuasion, and justification to a polity tethered to the
926 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a police officer's First Amendment challenge to his
termination for maintaining a sexually explicit website); Locurto v. Giuliani, 447
F.3d 159, 183 (2nd Cir. 2006) (rejecting public safety officers' First Amendment
challenge to their termination for their racially offensive off-duty speech); Pappas v.
Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 146-47 (2nd Cir. 2002) (upholding a police officer's
termination based on his racially offensive off-duty speech). I plan to address the
larger First Amendment implications of this collective trend involving greater
judicial deference to government's asserted expressive interests in its employees'
speech in an upcoming article.
4. Indeed, even before Garcetti, a number of commentators criticized the
Court's longstanding approach to public employees' First Amendment claims-
specifically, the Connick/Pickering test-as insufficiently protective of workers'
speech rights. See, e.g., Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle
to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 81 (1988)
(maintaining that the Connick test "unfairly burdens the employee by requiring him
to demonstrate that the speech fits neatly into a category of speech on a matter of
public concern .... [yet] the courts have not defined with certainty what speech is
protected") [hereinafter Allred]; Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public
Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1019 (2005) ("The Pickering/Connick
doctrine collapses into little more than the constitutionalization of a heckler's
veto."); Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public
Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (criticizing Connick as too
deferential to public employers' "mere anticipation of disruption as grounds for
employee discipline").
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policies and preferences acted upon by its
representatives . . . . Speech is but one means that
government must have at its disposal to conduct its
affairs and to accomplish its ends.5
Government speech is valuable as well as inevitable.
Government expression, for example, facilitates significant First
Amendment interests in sharing knowledge and discovering truth by
informing the public on a wide range of topics. 6 Even more important,
government speech furthers citizens' capacity to participate in
democratic self-governance by enabling them to identify and assess their
government's priorities. Government expression thus carries great
instrumental value because of what it offers its listeners: important
information that furthers the public's ability to evaluate its government.
For these reasons, the constitutional standards for evaluating the
government's control of its own speech differ dramatically from those
that apply to the government's regulation of private expression. On one
hand, government cannot discriminate on the basis of viewpoint when
regulating private speech unless its action satisfies the demanding
requirements of strict scrutiny.8 On the other hand, government's own
5. Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1380 (2001) [hereinafter Bezanson & Buss]. See
also Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1825 (1987) ("[I]t is probably
not too outlandish an exaggeration to conclude that government organizations would
grind to a halt were the Court seriously to prohibit viewpoint discrimination in the
internal management of speech.").
6. Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000)
("[G]overnment speech can help foster debate, fleshing out views, and leading
toward a more educated citizenry and a better chance of reaching the right answer.")
[hereinafter Greene]; Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565,
569 (1980) ("[S]peech financed or controlled by government plays an enormous role
in the marketplace of ideas.").
7. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 604 ("Governments, then, can justify subsidizing
the speech of public officials, not to reelect them or others, but because there is a
substantial interest in hearing what they have to say.... [T]he public would have the
advantage of knowing the collective judgment of the legislature and of knowing the
views of its representatives, which would in turn be useful for evaluating them.").
8. E.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (recounting
the First Amendment's bar on government's viewpoint-based discrimination against
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speech "is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny[,]" 9 leaving the
government generally free to adopt and deliver whatever message it
chooses when it speaks on its own behalf.10 Political accountability,
rather than the free speech clause, provides the recourse for those
unhappy with their government's own expressive choices.
Note, however, that constitutional constraints other than the First
Amendment's free speech clause may still limit governmental speech.
For example, government speech that endorses religion may violate the
establishment clause, and government speech that furthers race, gender,
or national origin discrimination may violate the equal protection
clause."' Moreover, while the government does not violate the free
speech clause when it prevents private speakers from joining or altering
its own speech, most courts and commentators conclude that government
generally possesses no First Amendment rights of its own. 2 Legislatures-
private speech); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1992) (striking
down St. Paul ordinance as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination). For
examples of the rare occasions on which governmental constraints on private speech
survived strict scrutiny, see, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992)
(upholding government's ban on campaign speech within 100 feet of polling places);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (upholding caps on campaign
contributions).
9. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005).
10. E.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
235 (2000) (distinguishing government's legitimate exercise of control over the
views it itself expresses from government's impermissible efforts to control the
views expressed by private speakers).
11. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 6, at 37-38 (describing government speech
that may violate the equal protection and/or establishment clauses, but not the free
speech clause).
12. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
139-42 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The First Amendment protects the press
from governmental interference; it confers no analogous protection on the
Government."); MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 42-45 (1983)
(concluding that government should not possess First Amendment free speech
rights) [hereinafter YUDOF]; Bezanson & Buss, supra note 5, at 1501-08 (same). For
an argument that state governments may be First Amendment rights holders,
however, see David Fagundes, State Actors as Government Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1637 (2006).
Note, however, that the Court has suggested that certain institutions with unique
communicative functions-such as universities or broadcasters-may have First
Amendment interests regardless of their public or private character. See Keyishian
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thus remain free to enact laws limiting government speech and, indeed,
they often do--most commonly, for example, by prohibiting government
from engaging in electioneering speech.
1 3
Government's claim to speech as its own arises most frequently
as a defense to First Amendment challenges by private speakers who
seek to alter or join what the government contends is its own expression.
As an illustration,14 consider the following dispute from the Fourth
Circuit: A public school board passed a resolution opposing proposed
school voucher legislation. The resolution also authorized public
communication of the school board's position on the district's website
and in e-mails and letters to parents and school employees. 5 A
v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (observing that universities' academic
freedom is "a special concern of the First Amendment"); Ark. Educ. Television
Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (noting public and private
broadcasters' First Amendment interests in journalistic freedom). But see United
States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 210-211 (2003) (declining to decide
whether government entities like public libraries have First Amendment rights of
their own); id. at 225-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to recognize
public libraries as First Amendment rights holders).
13. See YUDOF, supra note 12, at 170 (describing statutory restrictions on
government's partisan speech).
14. As another illustration, states and private parties both increasingly claim
the messages displayed on specialty license plates as their own expression. These
disputes have generated a circuit split. The Sixth Circuit, for example, concluded
that Tennessee's issuance of a "Choose Life" license plate reflected the legislature's
own pro-life views and thus constituted government speech within the state's power
to control; it thus rejected the ACLU's First Amendment challenge to the state's
denial of its request for a "Pro-Choice" plate. See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441
F.3d 370, 371-80 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 906 (2006). In contrast, the
Ninth Circuit characterized the same plates as predominantly private expression,
upholding the Arizona Life Coalition's challenge to Arizona's denial of its proposed
"Choose Life" plate. Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965-73 (9th
Cir. 2008); see also Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792-800 (4th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1119 (2005) (upholding Planned Parenthood's
First Amendment challenge to South Carolina's decision to issue a "Choose Life"
but not a "Pro-Choice" plate).
15. See Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 277 (4th Cir.
2008). In the interests of full disclosure, I note that I served pro bono as counsel of
record to amici in support of respondent school board in this case upon appeal. Brief
for Nat'l Sch. Boards Ass'n. et al. as Atnici Curiae Supporting Appellee, Page v.
Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 07-1697), 2007
WL 4114513.
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proponent of the legislation then requested that he be allowed to post his
pro-voucher materials on the district's website, and that he also be
allowed to use the school's communication channels to distribute his pro-
voucher materials to the school community.1 6  When the district
declined, he filed suit, arguing that his exclusion constituted viewpoint
discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.17 The school district
successfully defended on the ground that the government speech doctrine
permits it to communicate its own viewpoint without any obligation to
allow others to misappropriate or distort that expression. 
1
In a recent article on government speech, I proposed that a public
entity seeking to claim the government speech defense in disputes like
these should establish that (1) it expressly claimed the speech as its own
when it authorized the communication and (2) that onlookers understood
the speech to be the government's at the time of its delivery.' 9 First,
requiring that government identify itself as the source of a message at the
time of its creation forces government to articulate, and thus think
carefully about, its expressive decisions. It also prevents the after-the-
fact manufacture of a government speech defense as an opportunistic
reaction designed to thwart those challenging government's regulation of
what is really private speech. Second, even if government expressly
announces its intent to claim authorship of a message at the time of its
creation, much of the public may remain unaware of the message's
governmental source if it is actually delivered at some later point. To
16. Page, 531 F.3d at 277-79.
17. Id. at 279-80.
18. Id. at 288 (affirming the district court's judgment).
19. Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying
Expression's Source, 88 B.U. L. REv. 587 (2008). For other commentators'
thoughtful focus on meaningful accountability as a key measure of government
speech, see Bezanson & Buss, supra note 5, at 1384 (stating that government speech
"should be limited to purposeful action by government, expressing its own distinct
message, which is understood by those who receive it to be the government's
message"); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who's Talking? Disentangling Government and
Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35, 57-63 (2002) (defining government
speech to require both "general" and "specific" accountability); Gia B. Lee,
Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTiNGS L.J. 983, 1052
(2005) [hereinafter Lee] (arguing that a court should only conclude that something is
government speech if "a reasonable recipient understands that the government bears
responsibility for a communication").
[Vol. 7
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ensure that the public can realize the possibility of holding government
accountable as the source of messages they find objectionable, the
government should also be functionally identifiable as the source of the
message at the time of its delivery.
Because accountability efforts like petitioning and voting, rather
than the First Amendment, remain the appropriate check on government
speech, this approach emphasizes that such speech is most valuable and
least dangerous when members of the public can actually identify the
government as its source. By identifying two points at which
government must expose its expressive choices, this approach maximizes
opportunities for the public to engage in undeceived credibility
assessments and meaningful political accountability measures. If a
message's governmental source is obscured because the government fails
to identify the speech as its own both formally and functionally, then
political accountability provides no real safeguard and traditional First
Amendment analysis should apply to the government's regulation of the
contested expression.
Under this approach, the website and e-mails discussed above
20
should be considered the government's own speech that the First
Amendment permits it to control. In that example, the school board
publicly opposed pending legislation, and communicated that position in
e-mails, letters, and website postings that clearly identified their
21governmental origins. In so doing, the board provided the public with
valuable information about the opinions of a public education body on
proposed education policy, and any members of the public unhappy with
this position now know to seek to elect new board members.
In contrast, some contested speech fails to indicate its
governmental origin in a way that allows the public to evaluate the
message and its source. In Rust v. Sullivan, for example, the Supreme
Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to federal regulations that
barred family planning clinics from making any mention of abortion
22
when providing federally-funded counseling and referrals. Although at
the time it couched its holding in unconstitutional-conditions terms,23 the
20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
21. Page, 531 F.3d at 277-79.
22. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
23. Id. at 197-99.
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Court later described Rust as a government speech case: the government
had made the expressive choice to promote only some types of family
planning, and was thus free not only to express that view directly, but
also to pay others-like clinic workers-to express that view on the
government's behalf. 24
I agree that the First Amendment permits government to chooseS 25
to advocate a pro-life or a pro-choice view-or neither 2-because that
expressive choice provides the public with valuable information about its
government. I also agree that, as a practical matter, this must mean that
the First Amendment permits the government to pay employees or other
26agents to help it deliver its chosen message. But if the expression is to
be characterized as government speech exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny, the expression should be delivered in a way that allows the
public to understand it as their government's viewpoint, so that voters
can more accurately assess the message's credibility and hold the
government accountable for that viewpoint if they so desire.
In Rust, however, doctors, nurses, and other clinic employees
delivered the contested speech without any requirement that the
27expression's governmental origins be disclosed. They were instead
advised to respond to abortion-related requests by stating "'the project
does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning and
therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion.' ' 28  Under these
24. Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) ("The Court in
Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of
the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the
holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust on this understanding.").
25. Government's transparent decision to remain neutral on a particular topic
may reflect a strategic choice to conserve limited political capital and/or to reserve
judgment on a controversy as the public debate continues; either way, that decision
provides the public with valuable information about its government's priorities.
26. See Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment,
112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 100 (1998) ("[T]he state cannot literally speak, but can speak
only through the voices of others .... ).
27. Rust, 500 U.S. at 180 (explaining that employees of clinics receiving
federal funding were "expressly prohibited from referring a pregnant woman to an
abortion provider, even upon specific request.").
28. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (1989)) (While the regulations did not
require that the government be identified as the message's source, the majority
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circumstances, patients might well misunderstand clinic employees to be
offering their own independent counsel, rather than speaking as
government agents required to convey the government's view that
abortion is not a method of family planning to be discussed. 29 Because
health professionals may be considered more credible than the
government in this setting based on the public's perception of their
expertise and objectivity, patients may have been misled into evaluating
the counseling differently than they would have if the speakers had made
clear its governmental source. Expressly signaling the message's
governmental origins would have permitted listeners to evaluate its
quality more accurately, as well as to engage in political accountability
measures if they thought it appropriate to do so. Rust thus illustrates the
danger of treating expression that the government fails transparently to
claim as its own as government speech free from First Amendment
scrutiny.
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IN ASSESSING
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS: GARCETTI'S FAILURE
Recognizing that government speech is most valuable and least
dangerous when its governmental source is apparent should guide courts'
application of the government speech doctrine to public employees' First
Amendment claims: the First Amendment should be understood to
permit government to claim as its own-and thus control-the speech of
public employees that the government has specifically hired to deliver a
particular viewpoint that is clearly governmental in origin and thus open
to the public's meaningful credibility and accountability checks. This is
the case, for example, where a school board hires a press secretary or
lobbyist to promote its anti-voucher position; a health department hires
an employee to implement an anti-smoking promotional effort; a school
hires an educator to implement its abstinence-only youth public
education campaign; or a mayor commissions a muralist specifically to
observed that "[n]othing in [the Title X regulations] requires a doctor to represent as
his own any opinion that he does not in fact hold."); Id. at 200.
29. See, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 5, at 1394-96 (arguing that patients
could mistakenly attribute the government's views to their doctors); Robert C. Post,
Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 172-75 (1996) (same).
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create patriotic art for the Fourth of July, or art promoting racial equality
to celebrate Dr. King's birthday.
Each of these exemplifies government speech that is valuable to
its listeners because it clearly reveals to the public the expressive choices
of its government, enabling voters to evaluate the message's credibility
and take accountability measures as appropriate. Because that speech is
valuable to the public, the First Amendment should be understood to
permit government to protect that viewpoint from being undermined or
garbled-i.e., by taking adverse actions against such an employee who
engages in speech that undermines the delivery of that governmental
viewpoint.
Under this view, the value of government speech to the public
turns primarily on its transparency,3 ° rather than its popularity or even its
accuracy. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, inaccurate
speech is often inevitable and even valuable in a full and free public
debate.3 1 For this reason, the First Amendment should pose no bar to
government's choice to express the view that climate change is not the
result of human behavior; to engage employees specifically to help
deliver that view (so long, in my opinion, as the governmental source of
that view is apparent); and to take action against those employees if theirS • 32
speech undermines the delivery of the government's chosen viewpoint.
In that case, the government's expressive choice not only offers voters
valuable information about its priorities, but also spurs those with other
views to "unearth and disseminate facts that deepen the understanding of
both speakers and listeners" 33-thus furthering key First Amendment
30. See Lee, supra note 19 (urging transparency as the measure of government
speech).
31. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-73 (1964) (discussing
the societal benefits of permitting free speech even when that speech is inaccurate).
32. Even though the First Amendment does not require that the government's
speech be accurate, legislatures remain free to insist such accuracy as a statutory
matter. See, e.g., Note, Avoidance of an Election or Referendum when the
Electorate has been Misled, 70 HARV. L REV. 1077 (1957) (describing statutes
requiring truth in the government's statements accompanying propositions submitted
to voters).
33. Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of Expression 16
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1203, 1203 (2007-2008) ("False speech, therefore, is
valuable because it is an essential part of a larger system that works to increase
society's knowledge.").
[Vol. 7
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values of facilitating the public's participation in democratic self-
governance and encouraging further contributions to the marketplace of
ideas.
But while many employees' job duties require that they speak,
only the speech of public employees engaged to speak for the
government-i.e., those specifically hired to deliver a transparently
government message-should be considered the government's own
speech that is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. For this reason,
unless they were hired specifically to deliver the government's chosen
viewpoint, government scientists who dissent from that message are not
delivering the government's speech that remains subject to the
government's viewpoint-based control.34
This formulation, however, describes a much smaller slice of
public employee speech than does Garcetti's "pursuant to official duties"
test. The Garcetti Court distinguished speech that the government has
paid its employees or agents to deliver-and thus remains free to
control-from speech delivered by those individuals in their private
capacities: "[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes .... It suggested that the government "owns,"
for First Amendment purposes, speech for which it paid, with the power
to "exercise . . .employer control over what the employer itself has
commissioned or created." 
36
But a thoughtful application of this principle requires us to delve
more deeply into what exactly the government employer has "bought."
The prosecutor's office in Garcetti, for example, hired Mr. Ceballos not
to deliver a specific government viewpoint about the infallibility of the
34. To be sure, just because a public employee's speech does not constitute the
government's own speech does not mean that that employee's First Amendment
claim should necessarily prevail. As discussed infra, notes 48-53 and accompanying
text, the traditional Connick/Pickering balancing inquiry may still reveal that the
government's efficiency needs outweigh the worker's expressive interests.
35. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2005); see also id. at 423 ("When
an employee speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern, the First
Amendment requires a delicate balancing of the competing interests surrounding the
speech and its consequences. When, however, the employee is simply performing
his or her job duties, there is no warrant for a similar degree of scrutiny.").
36. Id. at 422.
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police department's factual assertions, but instead to provide sound legal
analysis and competent prosecution. As Justice Souter observed in
dissent, "Unlike the doctors in Rust, Ceballos was not paid to advance
one specific policy among those legitimately available, defined by a
specific message or limited by a particular message forbidden. 37 And
the Court's new rule required no evidence that the government received
anything other than the sound legal analysis and judgment for which it
had paid.38 Garcetti thus failed to distinguish the many government
employees whose job duties require them to speak (e.g., scientists,
lawyers, teachers, health care professionals, accountants) from those
relatively few who are required to speakfor the government.
39
By treating as unprotected any public employee's speech
delivered pursuant to that worker's official duties, the Garcetti majority
ignored the fact that government speech is insulated from First
Amendment scrutiny precisely because of its instrumental value to the
public as listeners. But, of course, the public's interest in what Mr.
Ceballos had to say about law enforcement is in no way diminished
because he uttered those views pursuant to his official duties; if anything,
the public interest may be enhanced because of his proximity and
40expertise as a deputy district attorney.
Indeed, public entities frequently hire workers specifically to
engage in speech that draws attention to dangerous or illegal conditions.
Yet, Garcetti empowers the government to punish those workers for
delivering just "what the employer itself has commissioned. " 4  Lower
courts now routinely apply Garcetti to reject the constitutional claims of
public employees fired because the government found their reporting of
37. Id. at 437 (Souter, J., dissenting).
38. See id. at 421 ("We hold that when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline."). .
39. See id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority opinion
as "portend[ing] a bloated notion of controllable government speech").
40. See id. at 430 (Souter, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that Garcetti's
new "official duties" rule protects internal employee reports of a school's racist
hiring practices when made by a teacher but not by a personnel manager, even
though the distinction matters not to the expression's value to the public).
41. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422.
[Vol. 7
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hazards or improprieties to be unwelcome or inconvenient. These
include claims by police officers terminated for reporting public
42officials' illegal or improper behavior, police officers discharged for
detailing health and safety violations, 3 health care workers disciplined
44for conveying concerns about patient care, primary and secondary
school educators punished for describing concerns about student
42. E.g., Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 597-98 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying
Garcetti to conclude that First Amendment does not protect police officers' report to
district attorney and other officers that police chief and deputy chief were harboring
an individual wanted on felony warrants when such reports were made pursuant to
their official duties); Maule v. Susquehanna Regional Police Comm'n, 2007 Dist.
LEXIS 73065 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that First Amendment
does not protect police chief's report of local councilman's improprieties to state
police for criminal investigation); Bland v. Winant, 2007 No. 03-6091, slip op. at 7-
11 (D.N.J. April 27, 2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that First Amendment
does not protect police representative's reporting of councilmember's arrest to
prosecutor); Wesolowski v. Bockelman, 506 F. Supp. 2d 118, 121-22 (N.D.N.Y.
2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that First Amendment does not protect
sheriffs department employee's report that corrections officer beat an inmate);
Andrew v. Clark, 472 F. Supp. 2d 659, 662-64 (D. Md. 2007) (applying Garcetti to
conclude that First Amendment does not protect police commander's criticism of
police handling of an incident in which officers shot and killed an elderly man
barricaded in his apartment); Bums v. Borough of Glassboro, No. 05-3034, slip op.
at 17 (D.N.J. June 11, 2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that First Amendment
does not protect police officer's report to internal affairs that chief sexually harassed
another officer).
43. E.g., Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2nd Cir. 2008)
(plaintiff police safety officers concede that, after Garcetti, the First Amendment
does not protect their speech identifying large number of cancers, miscarriages, birth
defects and other health problems suffered by individuals working a precincf with
underground gasoline tanks when such reports were made pursuant to plaintiffs'
official duties); Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 247 (3rd Cir. 2007) (applying
Garcetti to conclude that First Amendment does not protect reports by state troopers
and firearms instructors of health and safety hazards-including elevated heavy
metals levels-at shooting ranges, where such reports were made pursuant to their
official duties).
44. E.g., Barclay v. Michalsky, 493 F. Supp. 2d 269, 271 (D. Conn. 2007)
(applying Garcetti to conclude that First Amendment does not protect nurse's report
that workers in correctional facility's psychiatric ward were imposing excessive
restraints on patients when such reports were made pursuant to official duties);
Coward v. Gilroy, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30075, at 11-14 (N.D.N.Y. 2007)
(applying Garcetti to conclude that First Amendment does not protect family care
home operator's speech expressing concern about quality of patients' health care).
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treatment,45  and financial managers fired for reporting fiscal
46 ,47irregularities. Lower courts now seize on the "expedited review"
offered by Garcetti to quickly dispose of government workers' First
Amendment claims at great cost to the public's interest in government
transparency-precisely the value that the government speech doctrine
seeks to protect.
GOVERNMENT'S REMAINING POWER TO CONTROL EMPLOYEE SPEECH
THAT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE GOVERNMENT SPEECH
That the government cannot claim the speech of an employee as
its own in a particular situation does not mean that the worker's First
Amendment claim necessarily prevails. Instead, the dispute should
continue to the longstanding Connick!Pickering test, which is used for
assessing claims that the government has unconstitutionally punished
public employees for their speech. This test requires courts to balance
the individual employee's interest "as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern" and the government employer's interest in
45. E.g., Pagani v. Meriden Bd. of Educ., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92267, 11-12
(D. Conn. 2006) (applying Garcetti to conclude that First Amendment does not
protect teacher's report that another teacher had shared nude photos with students
when such reports were made pursuant to official duties); Houlihan v. Sussex Tech.
Sch. Dist., 461 F. Supp. 2d 252, 260-61 (D. Del. 2006) (applying Garcetti to
conclude that First Amendment does not protect school psychologist's reports of
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act noncompliance).
46. E.g., Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755,761-62 (11th Cir. 2006)
(applying Garcetti to conclude that First Amendment does not protect university
financial aid manager's reports of financial irregularities when such reports were
made pursuant to her official duties); Richards v. City of Lowell, 472 F. Supp. 2d
51, 80 (D. Mass. 2007) (applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment
does not protect city financial manager's report of financial improprieties); Levy v.
Office of Legislative Auditor, 459 F. Supp. 2d 494, 498-99 (M.D. La. 2006) (eagerly
applying Garcetti to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect state
auditor's Toastmaster speech criticizing office policy when court concluded that
government employer required participation in Toastmaster program to improve
public speaking skills).
47. See Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333, 1349 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (Birch, J.,
concurring) ("In Garcetti, the Court has built upon Pickering and succeeding cases
to give lower federal courts a distinction in analysis that expedites review of First
Amendment[ ] retaliation cases involving government employees ... ").
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efficiently providing public services. Under this test, some claims will
fail if found to involve speech on matters of personal grievance rather
49than public concern. Of those claims that do involve speech on matters
of public concern, some will fail because of the expression's adverse
effects on the government's efficiency interests. °
Indeed, Garcetti's focus on speech delivered pursuant to official
duties most appropriately deserves attention as part of this balancing
inquiry: a government employer's efficiency interest in regulating speech
delivered pursuant to a public employee's official duties is especially
strong because the intemperate tone or inaccurate content of that speech
carries significant potential to undermine efficient government
operations. The Garcetti majority, for example, correctly observed that
an employee's inflammatory or misguided speech delivered pursuant to
official duties threatens effective workplace operations: "Supervisors
must ensure that their employees' official communications are accurate,
demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer's mission.
5 1
But the Garcetti Court did not call for the government to show that Mr.
Ceballos' speech was flawed in any way, expressing concern that such a
requirement would "demand permanent judicial intervention in the
conduct of governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with sound
48. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
49. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (characterizing most of the plaintiffs
speech-a questionnaire directed to co-workers about office policies and practices-
as unprotected private grievances that failed to touch on matters of public concern);
Boyce, 510 F.3d at 1344-47 (11th Cir. 2007) (characterizing social services case
managers' complaints about their workloads as unprotected private grievances
intended to improve their own working conditions rather than speech on a matter of
public concern).
50. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the Connick/Pickering balancing test allows employers to discipline
employee speech that is inflammatory or misguided). Before Garcetti's bright-line
rule, courts generally characterized government workers' allegations of unsafe,
illegal, or improper behavior as matters of public concern, but reached mixed results
when weighing the value of that speech against its impact on the government
employer's operations depending on its accuracy or tone. See, e.g., Allred, supra
note 4, at 62-63.
51. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422-23.
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principles of federalism and the separation of powers. 52 Instead, the
majority's bright-line rule treated his speech pursuant to his official
duties-no matter how temperate, accurate, or otherwise sound-as
entirely unprotected by the First Amendment.53
CONCLUSION
Garcetti treats a wide swath of public employee speech-that
delivered pursuant to a government worker's "official duties"--as
entirely beyond the First Amendment's protection. But while
government can and should be held responsible for its operational
performance as well as for its expressive choices, the government's
political accountability to the electorate for its effectiveness may well be
undercut by the carte blanche Garcetti gives government to discipline
workers who truthfully report irregularities and improprieties pursuant to
their official duties.
Recognizing that government speech is most valuable and least
dangerous when its governmental source is apparent should help
determine the appropriate application of the government speech doctrine
to public employees' First Amendment claims. An approach informed
by such an understanding would permit the government to claim the
speech of its employees as its own only when it has specifically engaged
those employees to deliver a transparently governmental viewpoint. By
forcing government to expose its views in order to claim the power to
discipline employees' contrary speech, this approach recognizes that
government speech merits exemption from First Amendment scrutiny
only when it enhances listeners' ability to evaluate their government.
But rather than identifying a theoretically principled approach for
capturing the value of empowering government to control its own
speech, the Garcetti Court instead formalistically imposed a bright-line
rule to avoid the often challenging but entirely commonplace task of
52. Id. at 423.
53. See id. at 421 ("We hold that when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline.").
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balancing constitutional interests.54  Garcetti thus reflects a distorted
understanding of government speech that overstates government's own
expressive interests while undermining the public interest in transparent
government.
54. See id. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen constitutionally significant
interests clash, resist the demand for winner take all .... "); Charles W. "Rocky"
Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal
Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL. RTS. J. at 1173, 1187 (2007) ("Eschewing the
prevailing balancing standard governing [government employee free speech] claims,
the Court adopted a new categorical rule banning any constitutional safeguards.").
